

3 | Africa, West and the Sahel



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An additional 7.4 million people have faced high levels of acute food insecurity since 2023, attributable to insecurity and displacement in Chad, Nigeria and the Central Sahel, and to some extent increased coverage, mainly in Nigeria.

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In Mali, 2 600 people faced Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) due to conflict, insecurity and sustained humanitarian access constraints in Ménaka (Gao region).

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The number of forcibly displaced people continued to rise, driven by insecurity in the Central Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin and refugee outflows from the Sudan.

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High levels of acute malnutrition were particularly widespread in Chad, northeastern and northwestern Nigeria, northeastern Mali and the Niger.

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In 2025, widespread conflict and insecurity together with high food prices will continue to drive high levels of acute food insecurity. Adequate food availability from above-average crop production could ease pressure on prices and increase food access in the first half of 2025.

Africa, West and the Sahel

Benin (refugees) | Burkina Faso | Cameroon | Chad (residents, refugees and returnees) | Côte d'Ivoire (refugees) | Guinea | Guinea-Bissau | Liberia | Mali | Mauritania | Niger | Nigeria | Senegal | Sierra Leone | Togo (residents and refugees)

Persistent and spreading insecurity in the Central Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin as well as conflict in the Sudan increased displacement and acute food insecurity in the region. High inflation in Nigeria, the Niger and Sierra Leone drove worsening food access, while atypical floods in Chad, the Niger and Nigeria intensified acute food insecurity and malnutrition due to economic losses and diseases.

51.6M

people or 14% of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2024 in 13 countries with food crises.


10.3M

forcibly displaced people in 13 countries with food crises in 2024 – consisting of 7.6 million IDPs and 2.7 million refugees and asylum-seekers.


12.0M

acutely malnourished children in eight countries with food and nutrition crises in 2024. Of them, 3.5 million suffered the most severe form of acute malnutrition.

MAP 3.1 Numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity in 13 countries, 2024 peak




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Source: CH, 2024.

FIG 3.1 Share of analysed population facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2024 peak



The total population was analysed in all countries with data except Chad (92%), Nigeria (87%) and Togo (75%).

Fifteen countries in this region were selected. However, for the refugee populations in **Benin, Côte d'Ivoire** and **Togo**, data did not meet GRFC technical requirements. For more information on these additional populations of concern, see page 111.

How have the food crises in this region changed since 2023?

The estimated number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity increased from 44.3 million in 14 countries in 2023 to 51.6 million in 13 countries in 2024.

The prevalence of high levels of acute food insecurity rose from 11.2 percent to 13.7 percent. This marks both the highest number and the highest share of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity for the region in the history of Cadre Harmonisé (CH) analyses.


The absolute increase in the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity was driven by a large increase in **Nigeria** (+6.9 million people) and **Chad** (residents) (+1.1 million people). Other countries registered moderate increases, namely **Cameroon**, **Guinea**, **Mali**, **Mauritania**, the **Niger**, **Sierra Leone** and **Togo**. Only **Senegal** (-0.4 million people) and **Burkina Faso** (-0.7 million people) had a decrease in the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity, although the latter did not have new data for the November/December CH analysis cycle.

Residents in **Benin** and **Côte d'Ivoire**, which were included in the GRFC 2024, were not selected for the GRFC 2025, as they did not request external assistance. The non-inclusion of these countries accounted for 1.6 million fewer people in the regional total. Meanwhile, the inclusion of **Guinea-Bissau** added 0.1 million people to the total number of people in 2024.

In **Nigeria**, the increase in numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity was driven by conflict, displacement and very high inflation as well as an increase in analysis coverage (+6.8 million people analysed).

The acute food insecurity situation for the resident population of **Chad** has significantly deteriorated since the 2023 peak, reflecting the cumulative impacts of conflict, increased numbers of refugees and returnees, floods and economic hardship.

FIG. 3.2 Share of analysed population by phase of acute food insecurity, 2024 peak



Source: CH, March 2024 and December 2024.

These higher numbers occurred despite a decline in coverage, with the capital city N'Djamena not analysed.

In **Cameroon**, the slight deterioration was linked to persisting insecurity in the Nord-Ouest, Sud-Ouest and Extrême Nord, where floods further worsened the situation.

In the Central Sahel countries, the acute food insecurity situation was still largely driven by conflict and displacement, as well as high food prices. In **Mali**, the acute food insecurity situation remained dire, with Ménaka in the Gao region having populations in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) due to conflict and very limited physical access. In the **Niger**, a combination of insecurity, food inflation, reduced crop production and the fodder deficit resulted in a worsening food crisis. In

Burkina Faso, the situation improved, reflecting better food availability linked to favourable cereal and cash crop production, despite persisting conflict and insecurity, mainly in northern and eastern provinces (CH, March 2024), but no data were available for the November/December CH cycle.

In **Guinea**, the crisis worsened slightly, mostly driven by high prices of staple foods and fuel shortages, but increased analysis coverage also partly explained the increase. In **Mauritania**, dry spells reduced production of coarse grains and livestock, and high prices of staple foods led to a worsening food crisis. **Sierra Leone** saw an increase in the prevalence of high levels of acute food insecurity due to high inflation, local currency depreciation and rising fuel prices.

The expansion of the Central Sahel crisis to Gulf of Guinea coastal countries, notably **Benin**, **Côte d'Ivoire**, **Ghana** and **Togo**, led to increasing displacement and higher risk of deteriorating food insecurity in border areas. However, estimates on their food security were not available.

Severity of acute food insecurity

All 13 countries with food crises in the region had CH analyses with data disaggregated by phase of acute food insecurity.

 About 2 600 people projected in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in Mali.

During the 2024 lean season, from June to August, around 2 600 people were expected to face

Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in the conflict-affected Ménaka region. This is similar to the 2023 lean season, when 2 500 people were in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in **Mali** for the first time in the history of CH analyses.

In contrast, **Burkina Faso** saw a decrease in severity, with no populations estimated to be in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in 2024. This marks a significant positive shift compared with the 42 700 people estimated in this phase from June to August 2023.

2.7 million people in Emergency (CH Phase 4) across ten countries.

The number of people in CH Phase 4 was highest among countries affected by conflict and insecurity in the Central Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin, namely **Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad** (residents), **Burkina Faso**, the **Niger** and **Mali**, as well as **Senegal**, which was affected by economic shocks and weather extremes. **Nigeria** had the largest number of people in CH Phase 4, primarily in the northern states, while **Chad** (residents) and **Burkina Faso** recorded the highest proportion of their populations in this phase, at about 3 percent and 2 percent, respectively.

Overall, the number of people in CH Phase 4 in the region remained stable between 2023 and 2024. However, **Chad** (residents), **Mali** and, to a lesser extent, **Mauritania** and **Senegal** saw an increase in the number of people in CH Phase 4 since 2023, while **Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Guinea**, the **Niger, Nigeria** and **Sierra Leone** saw decreases.

48.9 million people in Crisis (CH Phase 3) across 13 countries.

The number of people in CH Phase 3 across the 13 countries increased in 2024 from 41.5 million in 14 countries in 2023, with increases in all countries except **Burkina Faso** and **Senegal**. **Sierra Leone** had the highest prevalence, with 20 percent of its population in CH Phase 3. **Mauritania** had 14 percent of its analysed population in this phase, while **Liberia** had 11 percent.

124.5 million people in Stressed (CH Phase 2) across 13 countries.

The number of people facing CH Phase 2 increased significantly from 109.4 million people across 14 countries in 2023. This reflects eroded livelihoods amid deteriorating economic conditions and persistent conflicts.

Drivers of food crises in the region, 2024

Conflict/insecurity was the primary driver in seven countries, where a total of 46.8 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity.


Prolonged violence and instability in the Lake Chad Basin and the Central Sahel affected **Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad, Mali**, the **Niger, Nigeria** and northern **Togo**. These seven countries accounted for 91 percent of the total population facing high levels of acute food insecurity in the 13 countries with food crises in the region.

The insecurity conditions have disrupted agricultural and pastoral activities, markets and humanitarian aid delivery, contributing to widespread displacement. For instance, the Extrême Nord of **Cameroon** has seen consecutive below-average harvests because of insecurity, while prices of staple foods were far higher than elsewhere in northeastern **Nigeria** and the Liptako–Gourma tri-border region, spanning **Mali, Burkina Faso** and the **Niger**, at the epicentre of the Central Sahel conflict. *See Focus | Conflict and insecurity in the region, page 98.*

Most forced displacement remained internal, as people fled violence and insecurity within their own countries. However, cross-border displacement is growing. Significant numbers of refugees and returnees have crossed from conflict-riven **Sudan** to eastern **Chad**, and from **Mali** to southeastern **Mauritania**.

Increased violence and insecurity in northern regions of Gulf of Guinea coastal countries have

FIG. 3.3 Highest food inflation rates 2024 (compared with same month in 2023)



Sources: National Bureau of Statistics, Nigeria; Institut National de la Statistique et de l'Analyse Economique, Benin; Ghana Statistical Services; Institut National de la Statistique de Guinée; Central Bank of Liberia; ANSADE, Mauritania; ANSD, Senegal; Statistics Sierra Leone Institut National de la Statistique et de la Demographie, Burkina Faso; Institut National de la Statistique, des Etudes Economiques et Démographiques (INSEED), Tchad; Institut National de la Statistique, Mali; Institut National de la Statistique du Niger; DGSCN, Togo.

led to deteriorating acute food insecurity and a rise in cross-border and internal displacement.

Economic shocks were the primary driver in six countries, where 4.8 million people faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2024.

Economic shocks were the primary driver in **Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mauritania, Senegal** and **Sierra Leone**. High inflation severely affected **Sierra Leone** as well as **Nigeria** and the **Niger**, while **Chad** (residents) also grappled with worsening economic conditions. High fertilizer prices and dependence on imported goods further strained the region's economic resilience.

In **Nigeria**, high food inflation has persisted since the unification of exchange rates and the removal of fuel subsidies in mid-2023, leading to steady increases in food prices (CILSS, December

2024; FEWS NET, October 2024). Its currency continued to depreciate, which, since the country is significantly dependent on imports, pushed the inflation rate upwards, weakening household purchasing power.

Sierra Leone continued experiencing high inflation (even if this decreased significantly throughout 2024), further reducing households' purchasing power. The **Niger** also witnessed an inflation increase linked to trade disruptions due to the border closure with **Benin** (WB, October 2024) and ECOWAS economic sanctions until February 2024 (CILSS, December 2024).


Prices across the Sahel were stable or rising from August to September as the lean season concluded, while seasonal declines occurred in coastal countries where harvesting began (FEWS NET, September 2024). However, prices remained well above five-year averages due to below-average stocks, high demand, insecurity, macroeconomic challenges and flooding. Border closures in ten countries over the past two years have severely disrupted cross-border agricultural trade (CILSS, December 2024).

Weather extremes were not the main driver in any country, but floods in the second half of 2024 severely affected Chad (residents), Mali, the Niger, Nigeria and Senegal.

Weather conditions during the 2023/2024 cropping season were generally favourable, supporting adequate crop and pastoral production across most areas. Agricultural outputs were near their previous year's levels and above the five-year average. However, localized rainfall deficits, dry spells and flooding led to below-average production in localized areas (CILSS, 2024).

During the 2024/2025 cropping season, cumulative rainfall was average to above-average across Sahelian countries but average to below-average in some coastal areas. Rainfall distribution was erratic in Sahelian regions, with dry spells in July and August affecting parts of **Mauritania, Nigeria** and **Senegal**. This was followed by torrential

FIG. 3.4 Peak numbers of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity, 2016–2024



Source: GRFC 2017–2025.

rains that caused widespread flooding across the Sahelian belt, from **Chad** to **Senegal** (CH, December 2024).

While the abundant rains benefited crop and pastoral production in most Sahelian countries, **Senegal** experienced a significant decline, with crop production estimated to drop by nearly 50 percent year-on-year (CH, December 2024).

Flooding during the 2024 rainy season had devastating consequences across the region. Nearly 6 million people were affected across all countries included, except **Guinea-Bissau**, with nearly 1 million people displaced. **Chad** and the **Niger** were the hardest hit, with 1.9 million and 1.5 million people affected, respectively, while **Nigeria** reported the highest number of people displaced, at 730 000.

In **Mali**, 0.9 million hectares of cropland were flooded, with an estimated 1.1 million tonnes of crop losses, equating to the kilocalorie requirements of about 14.3 million people for a year (FAO DIEM, October 2024). The collapse of the Dire dam in the Niger Delta damaged over 4 000 shelters (OCHA, November 2024).

Acute food insecurity since 2016

The prevalence of high levels of acute food insecurity increased from 5 percent in 2016 to 12 percent in 2022, briefly declining to 11 percent in 2023 before reaching 14 percent in 2024.

The number of people experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity in West Africa and the Sahel has risen steadily almost every year since 2016, with 2018 being the sole exception. Between 2016 and 2024, the figure more than quadrupled, increasing from approximately 11.6 million to 51.6 million people, also due to increasing analysis coverage.

The growing prevalence of acute food insecurity reflects the convergence of multiple, overlapping crises. The ongoing cost-of-living crisis, which finds its origin in the economic repercussions of COVID-19 and the war in Ukraine, has compounded vulnerabilities across the region. This has been further exacerbated by widespread violence and insecurity, particularly in the Central Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, where agricultural livelihoods have been severely disrupted.

Intensifying weather extremes, such as the pastoralist crisis of 2018 and the floods of 2022 and 2024, have worsened the situation. The Sahel is recurrently affected by severe droughts – in countries that still heavily rely on rainfed agriculture and pastoralism – leading to significant crop and livestock losses. These events inflicted significant losses on livelihoods, reducing households' capacities to sustain their food consumption and withstand future shocks.

This rise in absolute numbers can partly be attributed to population growth and broader coverage of CH analyses. The population analysed across the region grew by 30 percent between 2016 and 2022. In **Nigeria**, it increased from 49 percent in 2020 to 91 percent in 2023, as the coverage expanded from 16 states in 2020 to 21 states in 2021, and then to 26 states (plus the Federal Capital Territory (FCT) in all years) in 2023 and 2024. This extended coverage is also driven by a geographical expansion of acute security.

Among the 13 countries in the GRFC 2025, 11 are protracted food crises, as they have been consistently included in the report since 2016 – namely **Burkina Faso**, **Cameroon**, **Chad**, **Guinea**, **Liberia**, **Mali**, **Mauritania**, the **Niger**, **Nigeria**, **Senegal** and **Sierra Leone**.

Cameroon, **Chad**, the **Niger** and **Nigeria** were initially grouped under the Lake Chad Basin regional crisis in 2017, 2018 and 2019. **Guinea-Bissau** has been included seven times and **Togo** four. **Benin**, **Cabo Verde**, **Côte d'Ivoire**, the **Gambia** and **Ghana** are not included in this edition of the GRFC due to the absence of major shocks and no request for external assistance in 2024, but have been included intermittently in other editions.

Refugee populations in **Benin**, **Côte d'Ivoire** and **Togo** were selected for the GRFC 2025, but were not included due to lack of data meeting GRFC technical requirements. Similarly, refugees in **Ghana** were identified but not included in the GRFC 2024.

Structural vulnerabilities underlie persistently high levels of acute food insecurity

The region is highly vulnerable to extreme weather events. The Global Climate Risk Index assesses country vulnerability and exposure to climate-related risks. **Chad**, **Mauritania** and **Sierra Leone** rank in the top half of the rankings and other countries in the region fall in the middle. The ASAP crop and pasture index highlights a high frequency of droughts in Sahelian countries (EC-JRC, December 2024).

A large part of the population of Central Sahel strongly depends on the annual rains and is thus chronically vulnerable to deviations from a normal season (e.g. delay in the onset of the rainy season, dry period within the rainy season, early end, etc.). Rainfall during the wet season (June to September) in the Central Sahel is highly variable from year to year, rendering sowing dates and crop development subject to large variations and significant unreliability (Brouillet et al., November 2022).

The share of employment in agriculture is larger in most Sahelian countries than elsewhere in the region: in **Burkina Faso**, the **Niger**, **Chad** and **Mali**, more than 60 percent of the employed population work in agriculture (FAO, November 2024).

Three countries have a cereal import dependency ratio above 50 percent – the **Gambia**, **Liberia** and **Mauritania**, making them highly vulnerable to economic shocks including global market shifts and currency fluctuations. **Côte d'Ivoire**, **Benin**, **Senegal**, **Cameroon**, **Sierra Leone** and **Guinea** have a cereal import dependency ratio between 30 percent and 50 percent (FAO, November 2024).

These vulnerabilities limit the capacity for human development, as evidenced by the low scores and rankings these countries receive on the HDI. The **Niger** and **Chad** are tied at 189th and **Mali** is ranked 188th out of 193 countries. The best-off country in the region is **Cameroon**, ranked 151st (UNDP, 2024).

Annual population growth remains high. **Chad** has one of the highest population growth rates in

the world at 5.7 percent, while the **Niger** reaches 3.3 percent (UNDESA). All other countries in the region have population growth rates between 2 and 3 percent except **Ghana** (1.9 percent). These fast-growing rates lead to a population with a low age dependency ratio, but also place pressure on the food system to continue increasing supply to meet the demands of a rapidly growing population.

Economic growth is an effective strategy for tackling food insecurity (Bogmans et al., September 2024). West Africa GDP was expected to grow from 3.3 percent in 2023 to 3.9 percent in 2024. GDP per capita remained low, especially in **Burkina Faso, Chad, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, the Niger and Sierra Leone**. GDP per capita was slightly higher in **Côte d'Ivoire** and **Nigeria**.

According to the 2023 Fragile States Index (FFI, June 2023), which assesses the risk a country faces in managing pressures from economic, political and social factors, **Chad** ranks in the 'High Alert' category, **Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Guinea, Mali, the Niger and Nigeria** in the 'Alert' category. **Burkina Faso** is among the countries where risk deteriorated the most in 2024.

The INFORM Risk Index, a composite indicator, identifies countries at high risk of humanitarian crisis likely to require humanitarian assistance. **Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali** and the **Niger** are classified 'Very High' while **Benin, Cameroon, Nigeria and Togo** rank as 'High' (EC-JRC, 2024).

Acute food insecurity outlook, 2025

Around 46.9 million people or 13 percent of the analysed population in 11 countries are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity during June–August 2025. No projections are available for Burkina Faso and Liberia.

Overall, in the 11 countries with data for both 2024 and 2025, the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity is expected to decline by 1.5 million. Increases are projected in **Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Senegal and Togo**, with **Guinea** and **Senegal** both showing higher numbers

FIG. 3.5 Selected structural vulnerability indicators by country

	Annual population growth: UNDESA for population (%)	Cereal import dependency ratio (%)	Crop growing period affected by drought conditions (%)	Rangeland growing period affected by drought condition (%)	HDI global ranking (1–192)	INFORM Risk (0–10)	Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment (%)
BENIN	2.5	46.4	21.2	16.2	173	5.1	28.4
BURKINA FASO	2.3	17.1	18.3	17.6	185	7.3	74.2
CAMEROON	2.6	34.9	13.7	7.8	151	6.5	42.2
CHAD	5.7	5.2	18.3	18.5	189	7.7	69.2
CÔTE D'IVOIRE	2.5	49.0	16.6	8.9	166	4.2	45.6
GAMBIA	2.3	84.9	16.2	16.9	174	3.7	47.5
GUINEA	2.4	30.7	9.8	7.0	181	4.2	60.3
GUINEA-BISSAU	2.2	N/A	N/A	11.2	179	3.7	50.3
LIBERIA	2.2	71.9	N/A	4.2	177	4.6	39.3
MALI	3.0	7.1	15.3	15.4	188	7.0	68.0
MAURITANIA	3.0	57.3	17.2	20.5	164	4.8	33.0
NIGER	3.3	24.6	18.5	17.7	189	7.3	70.9
NIGERIA	2.1	17.8	17.4	15.6	161	6.8	38.0
SENEGAL	2.3	45.4	22.5	19.7	169	4.1	21.5
SIERRA LEONE	2.2	31.0	N/A	5.3	184	4.2	43.4
TOGO	2.3	29.1	17.9	11.3	163	5.6	30.8

For descriptions of these indicators see Technical notes, page 170.

Sources: UNDESA (Annual population growth); FAO (Cereal import dependency ratio); EC-JRC (Crop growing period affected by drought condition); EC-JRC (Rangeland growing period affected by drought condition); UNDP (HDI Global Index); EC-JRC (INFORM Risk Index); FAO (Share of agricultural, forestry and fishery employment).

of people in CH Phase 4 and **Mali** having pockets of IDPs facing Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) between June and August 2025. Reductions are expected in **Cameroon, Chad** (residents and refugees), **Mauritania, the Niger, Nigeria and Sierra Leone**, although an increase in the number of people facing CH Phase 4 is expected in Cameroon and Nigeria, reflecting localized deteriorations in acute food insecurity (CILSS, April 2025).

The sharpest relative deteriorations are expected in **Guinea** and **Senegal**. In **Guinea**, 0.8 million more people are expected to face high levels of acute food insecurity during March to May 2025, due to high food prices and 2024 flood impacts. In **Senegal**, 0.4 million more people are projected, reaching the highest CH estimate recorded for the country, due to poor 2024/25 crop production.

The largest absolute improvements are expected in the **Niger** and **Nigeria**, with over 1 million fewer people projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity, thanks to favourable harvests and easing inflation. However, **Nigeria** remains the region's largest and the world's third-largest food crisis.

Insecurity is likely to persist in the Central Sahel, northern **Togo** and **Benin**, the Lake Chad Basin and parts of northwestern and central **Nigeria**, limiting movements, market and food access and economic and agricultural activities, as well as fuelling displacement and erosion of livelihoods (CILSS, April 2025).

As conflict in the Central Sahel has expanded and evolved, it has increasingly affected urban centres

and northern areas of coastal countries (ACLED, December 2024).

In addition, the conflict in the **Sudan** is likely to continue pushing refugees into **Chad**, putting further pressure on the already limited local resources of communities and governmental bodies. Insecurity will continue limiting free movement of people and goods, restricting humanitarian access to fragile areas, and pushing governments to increase their military spending to the detriment of essential social and economic investment (ACLED, December 2024).

The high inflation rates observed in 2024 in several countries, especially **Nigeria** and **Sierra Leone**, are expected to lower slightly in 2025 but to remain very high in both these countries and high in most others in the region. Only **Benin, Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Senegal** and **Togo** are expected to maintain inflation below 3 percent. This situation is exacerbated by the growing dependence of both urban and rural populations on markets for food (CILSS, April, 2025).

The 2024/2025 agricultural season was generally favourable (FAO, November 2024; CILSS, December 2024, April 2025) and will provide slightly better food availability and food access during the first quarter of 2025 in areas not affected by insecurity, access issues or floods.

Mauritania's, Senegal's and Togo's cereal harvests and **Nigeria's** maize, millet and sorghum harvests were below average (CILSS, April 2025) and may lead to local food availability issues earlier than usual in those countries.

In the Sahel, the availability of fodder and water for livestock was generally satisfactory, except in **Senegal**, where drought led to deficits. Despite favourable availability across most of the Sahel, access to pasture will remain a major challenge in conflict zones (CILSS, April 2025).

The impacts of the 2024 widespread floods on livelihoods due to destruction of crops, livestock and infrastructure will continue to be felt in 2025, especially in **Chad, the Niger and Nigeria** (CILSS, December 2024, April 2025).

ACUTE MALNUTRITION | Eight countries – as well as the refugee populations in Chad – were identified as facing a nutrition crisis.


Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad (residents and refugees), **Mali, Mauritania**, the **Niger, Nigeria** and **Senegal** were countries with a nutrition crisis. **Mali** had the most severe nutrition crisis in the region and was among the four most severe nutrition crises globally, as it had areas classified in Extremely Critical (IPC AMN Phase 5).

Burkina Faso, Cameroon, Chad (residents and refugee populations), **Mali**, the **Niger** and **Nigeria** all had areas classified in Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4). High levels of acute malnutrition were particularly widespread in **Chad** (residents), in northwestern **Mali** and northeastern **Nigeria**, northeastern **Mali** and the **Niger** (CILSS, December 2024).

Since 2023, the nutrition situation has deteriorated in two countries – **Burkina Faso** and **Nigeria** (northeast and northwest). In **Mali** and the **Niger**, the nutrition situation overall improved, but experienced localized deteriorations.

Acute malnutrition estimates and contextual factors between 2019 and 2024 indicated nutrition crisis conditions in 2024 in **Senegal** and **Mauritania**, despite the lack of prevalence data for this year. For both countries, the most recent outcome data were from 2023 and indicated areas with global acute malnutrition (GAM) prevalence ranging from 15 to 29.9 percent, equivalent to Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4).

FIG. 3.6 Number of children aged 6–59 months with acute malnutrition in eight countries, 2024



1.3M pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition in six countries, 2024

No data were available on the nutrition situation of PBW among the Chad refugee population, or in Mauritania or Senegal.

Sources: IPC TWGs 2024 and 2025; UNICEF-WFP food security and nutrition hotspot analysis, February 2024; WCARO Database.

Acute malnutrition trends, 2020–2024

In areas in the north of **Burkina Faso**, **Chad** (residents), central **Mali**, southern **Niger** and northeastern and northwestern **Nigeria**, the prevalence of acute malnutrition has been persistently high between 2020 and 2024. In **Cameroon** and **Mauritania**, the situation deteriorated over this period, with a GAM prevalence between 10 and 14.9 percent in specific areas of **Cameroon** and nationally in **Mauritania**. **Senegal** also saw a deterioration between 2019 and 2023, with GAM prevalence increasing to over 15 percent in three regions (DHS 2019, 2023).

Main contributing factors to nutrition crises, 2024

Basic causes

High levels of displacement and reduced access to food, nutrition assistance and basic services were observed in Sahelian countries due to a combination of shocks (UN, December 2024).

These included insecurity in the Central Sahel and Lake Chad Basin, the spillover of the conflict in the **Sudan**, severe flooding in the second half of 2024 across northern **Cameroon, Chad, Mali**, the **Niger, Nigeria** and **Senegal**, and drought episodes in localized areas of Sahelian countries. Inflation was an additional pressure, with more than half of households across the region unable to afford a nutritious diet (CILSS, 2024).

Recurrent and multiple shocks in the region coincided with a reduction in humanitarian funding (ACF, May 2024). For example, in **Nigeria**, a lack of resources led to the closure of nearly a third of the 813 facilities managing acute malnutrition, putting many lives at risk (OCHA, December 2024).

Underlying and immediate causes

Among the seven IPC-analysed **nutrition** crises, four (**Cameroon, Chad** (residents), the **Niger** and **Nigeria**) exhibited ‘very high’ acute malnutrition risk factors across food, health, and care and services pathways, indicating multiple layers of nutritional vulnerabilities and a complex nutrition situation.

In **Mali** and for refugees and host populations in **Chad**, there were ‘very high’ risk factors in the food and care and services pathways. In **Burkina Faso**, there were ‘very high’ risk factors for acute malnutrition in the food and health pathways.

2025 outlook

IPC AMN projections for **Burkina Faso, Mali** and the **Niger** indicate that the situation will become less severe through to May 2025, reflecting the low season for acute malnutrition. A further projection for **Burkina Faso** extending to May–July indicates an increase in severity, in line with seasonal trends (IPC, February 2025; IPC, November 2024; IPC, January 2025).

In **Nigeria**, this pattern of lower acute malnutrition in the early part of the year is expected to be disrupted in the northeast due to flash floods, insecurity, widespread population displacement

and inflation, with additional areas classified in IPC AMN Phase 4 (IPC, November 2024).

Estimates, including IPC AMN projections, for 2025 are unavailable for the remaining four countries with nutrition crises.

FIG. 3.7 Number of children aged 6–59 months with acute malnutrition, 2024





FIG. 3.8 Number of pregnant and breastfeeding women with acute malnutrition, 2024




Sources: IPC TWGs 2024 and 2025; UNICEF-WFP, February 2024; Niger IPC TWG, January 2025; WCARO Database.

DISPLACEMENT | Protracted conflict and spreading insecurity further increased population displacement in the region in 2024.

More than 10 million people had been forcibly displaced in 13 countries with food crises in the region by the end of 2024. This growing number – around 0.6 million more than 2023 – is due to continued political instability, protracted conflicts and worsening insecurity (UNHCR, January 2025). Among them, displaced children were disproportionately affected, experiencing heightened vulnerabilities to food and nutrition insecurity.

Border areas remain hotspots for security crises, particularly the Liptako–Gourma region in the Central Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin, as well as northwestern and central-northern **Nigeria**, western **Cameroon** and northern areas of **Benin**, **Côte d'Ivoire** and **Togo** (CILSS, December 2024). Persistent conflicts in the Sudan have driven migration flows into eastern **Chad** – especially

FIG 3.9 Total number of forcibly displaced people in countries with food crises, 2024



Sources: UNHCR, October 2024; OCHA, December 2024; IOM, June 2024; IOM, July 2024; IOM, September 2024; UNHCR Nowcasted estimates, December 2024.



**1.0M people were displaced
by floods in 2024**

since April 2023 – while the Central Sahel crisis continues to spread to northern areas of coastal countries, including **Côte d'Ivoire**, **Benin** and **Togo**.

The region faces a growing internal displacement crisis, with 7.7 million IDPs across seven countries by the end of 2024 – an increase of approximately 0.3 million since the end of 2023. This rise is primarily attributed to conflict and insecurity in the Central Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin (UNHCR, December 2024). The most significant increase was recorded in the **Niger** and northern **Nigeria**. Additionally, around 9 700 people were internally displaced in **Togo** due to the spillover of the Central Sahel security crisis.

Of the 2.7 million refugees and asylum-seekers in the region, nearly 50 percent are hosted in **Chad** (mainly from the Sudan and, to a lesser extent, the Central African Republic), the **Niger** (primarily from Nigeria and Mali) and **Cameroon** (mainly from Central African Republic, Nigeria and the Niger). Countries with long-standing refugee populations include **Chad**, **Mauritania** and the **Niger**, reflecting limited opportunities for return to countries of origin (UNHCR, 2024).

Acute food insecurity among displaced populations

While most CH analyses cover the total population of the country, including IDPs, in acute food insecurity assessments disaggregated analyses for IDP populations are fewer.


In 2024, CH analyses for IDPs were only available for the northern Borno, Sokoto and Zamfara states of **Nigeria**. For refugee populations, CH analyses were only available for refugees and returnees in **Chad**.

During the 2024 lean season from June to August, the situation was particularly difficult for IDPs in northwestern **Nigeria**, with half of the 170 000 IDPs analysed in Sokoto and Zamfara states facing high levels of acute food insecurity, including 19 000 in Emergency (CH Phase 4) (CH, March 2024).

During the October–December 2024 post-harvest season, about a third of the analysed IDP population in Borno, Sokoto and Zamfara states faced high levels of acute food insecurity, with 5 percent in CH Phase 4. The acute food insecurity situation was projected to remain unchanged in these states during the 2025 lean season, with 7 percent of IDPs facing CH Phase 4 (CH, December 2024).

Among the 1.3 million refugees in **Chad**, about 460 000, or 30 percent of the analysed population, faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 2024. Of these, nearly 112 000 people faced CH Phase 4. Their situation is projected to worsen in 2025, with about 39 percent projected to be in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) between June and August 2025 and nearly 190 000 in CH Phase 4 (CH, November 2024).

MAP 3.2 Number of forcibly displaced people by country, 2024




► IDPs

► Refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: UNHCR, October 2024; OCHA, December 2024; IOM, June 2024; IOM, July 2024; IOM, September 2024; UNHCR Nowcasted estimates, December 2024.

FIG 3.10 Total number of forcibly displaced people in countries with food crises, 2013–2024



Sources: 2013–2022: UNHCR; IDM; UNRWA. 2023–2024: UNHCR Nowcasted estimates December 2023–2024; IOM.

Acute malnutrition among displaced populations

Disaggregated data on the nutritional status of the displaced population remain scarce.

In **Chad**, an IPC acute malnutrition analysis across 25 refugee camps and six host villages revealed Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4) levels of acute malnutrition in 2024. Refugee camps along the Sudanese border were the most affected. In 2024, over 58 000 children aged 6–59 months faced acute malnutrition, including 7 000 with severe acute malnutrition. During the peak of acute malnutrition from June to September 2024, four camps were in Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4) and 11 were in Serious (IPC AMN Phase 3) (IPC, May 2024).

In 2023, in the **Niger**, UNHCR's Standardized Expanded Nutrition Surveys (SENS) showed concerning levels of acute malnutrition in five refugee sites, particularly in Abala and Ayerou, where anaemia levels were high among children and women. In **Nigeria**, SENS data indicated low acute malnutrition rates in five refugee sites but poor food consumption scores, underscoring challenges with dietary quality (UNHCR, 2023).

Focus | Conflict and insecurity in the region

The conflicts in West Africa and the Sahel, particularly in the Central Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin, rank among the most complex and devastating crises globally.

ACLED reported a stable yet persistently high number of violent incidents across the region in 2024, with 24 300 fatalities recorded during the year (ACLED, 2024).

These crises are regional and cross-border in nature, as violent dynamics frequently spill into neighbouring countries, exacerbating instability and driving mass displacement. Rooted in governance failures, violent extremism and socioeconomic vulnerabilities, these crises are further compounded by environmental pressures, including climate change and resource scarcity (ACLED, December 2024; Agbonifo et al., 2022; OCHA, June 2024). They have disrupted livelihoods, heightened food insecurity and left millions dependent on humanitarian assistance.

The Central Sahel crisis

The Central Sahel – encompassing **Burkina Faso**, **Mali** and the **Niger** – has emerged as a hotspot of insecurity since 2019. The Liptako–Gourma region,

at the intersection of these three countries, is plagued by insurgencies, intercommunal tensions and weak governance. Over the past decade, the crisis has worsened, with coups d'état in all three countries. Since 2022, violence has spilled over into northern areas of coastal countries including **Benin**, **Côte d'Ivoire** and **Togo**, spreading instability (IOM, December 2024). The regional dimensions of these conflicts are reflected in the influx of refugees and forced migrants into border areas. Southeastern **Mauritania** continued to receive refugees and asylum-seekers escaping violence in **Mali**, highlighting the transboundary impacts of insecurity in the Central Sahel (UNHCR, 2024). These population movements place immense pressure on local resources, complicate humanitarian response efforts and amplify the interconnected nature of the crises.

The Lake Chad Basin crisis

The Lake Chad Basin, spanning northeastern **Nigeria**, western **Chad**, eastern **Niger** and **Cameroon's** Extrême Nord, has endured over a decade of conflict initiated by the Boko Haram insurgency. This crisis has been compounded by poverty, environmental degradation and limited

state presence, fostering conditions for ongoing violence (LCBC, January 2023; OCHA, June 2024). Displacement remains a defining feature, with 6.5 million IDPs recorded by early 2024 (IOM, December 2024). Cross-border movements, particularly into **Chad** and **Cameroon**, underline the regional dimension of this crisis. Refugee influxes into **Chad** from the Sudan further strain host communities already grappling with insecurity and resource scarcity (ECHO, December 2024).

Emerging dynamics show an evolution of conflict into urban areas, a concerning development for the region. Violent extremist groups and criminal networks are increasingly targeting urban centres for recruitment, fundraising and attacks. These groups exploit urban vulnerabilities, such as high unemployment and weak infrastructure, to embed themselves within cities. The rise of urban violence exacerbates the already severe strain on public services and deepens insecurity, with urban displacement patterns mirroring the rural exodus caused by conflict (ACLED, December 2024).

Children bear the brunt of these crises


In the Central Sahel, displaced children have increased fivefold over the past five years, from 0.3 million in 2019 to 1.8 million in 2024 (Save the Children, March 2024). Many are out of school, face acute malnutrition and lack access to healthcare, deepening vulnerabilities. The closure of thousands of schools across **Burkina Faso**, **Mali** and the **Niger** deprives millions of education, while health facility disruptions exacerbate malnutrition and public health crises. These conditions perpetuate cycles of poverty and insecurity, leaving a generation at risk of developmental setbacks (Save the Children, March 2024).

Impact on the region's agricultural production

Conflict has also devastated agricultural production, disrupting traditional livelihoods and markets. Insecurity restricts access to fields, displaces farming communities and destroys food stocks. In **Burkina Faso** and **Cameroon**, crop yields have plummeted in conflict-affected northern regions (FAO, December 2024; FEWS NET, June 2024). Traditional transhumance routes have been disrupted, forcing herders into overcrowded areas,

TIMELINE | The evolution of conflicts in the region

CENTRAL SAHEL (BURKINA FASO, MALI, NIGER)



2012
The Malian crisis begins with a Tuareg rebellion and the subsequent coup d'état. Northern Mali is occupied by separatist and Islamist groups.

2014
Establishment of the G5 Sahel regional security alliance to combat insurgencies.

2015
Algiers agreement, also known as the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali.


2020–2021
Mali experiences two coups, leading to a military transitional government.

2022
Burkina Faso sees two coups, marking further political instability. France withdraws troops from Mali.

2023
The Niger experiences a coup in July. The G5 Sahel effectively dissolves as the Niger, Burkina Faso and Mali withdraw.

2022–2024
Violence spreads to northern coastal countries, including Benin, Côte d'Ivoire and Togo, with increased displacement and insecurity.

LAKE CHAD BASIN (NIGERIA, NIGER, CHAD, CAMEROON)



2002
Boko Haram is founded in northeastern Nigeria.

2014
The group gains international attention with the Chibok schoolgirls' kidnapping in Nigeria.

2015
The Multinational Joint Task Force is revitalized to combat Boko Haram's regional threat.

2016
Boko Haram splits into two factions: Abubakar Shekau's faction and ISWAP, aligned with ISIS.

where competition for grazing land intensifies tensions. Conflict-related livestock losses have severely affected pastoral livelihoods, further undermining food security (FEWS NET, August 2024).

Economic disruptions are profound

Insecurity has severed trade routes, crippled markets and led to border closures, such as between **Nigeria** and the **Niger** in 2023. Regional currency depreciation, including the Nigerian naira, has eroded household purchasing power. Farmers face challenges accessing seeds, fertilizers and markets, while pastoralists lose livestock to conflict and displacement. These factors deepen dependency on humanitarian aid, limiting opportunities for economic recovery (FEWS NET, August 2024).

Climate change exacerbates these crises

Erratic rainfall, prolonged droughts and frequent floods heighten competition for scarce resources, intensifying conflicts over water, grazing land and arable soil. Displaced populations, concentrated in resource-scarce areas, face heightened challenges as coping mechanisms collapse. Damage to infrastructure, such as irrigation systems, undermines the community's resilience and ability to adapt to environmental shocks. ACLED's Conflict Watchlist for 2025 highlights the interplay

between these environmental factors and the strategic expansion of armed groups into coastal states, including **Benin** and **Togo**, as they exploit porous borders and local grievances (ACLED, December 2024).

Humanitarian access constraints

Humanitarian access in the Central Sahel and the Lake Chad Basin is increasingly constrained by insecurity, violence and administrative restrictions (OCHA, June 2024).

Conflict, military operations and improvised explosive devices make conditions unsafe for humanitarian actors. Attacks on aid workers have led authorities to require armed escorts, compromising neutrality. Bureaucratic hurdles slow aid delivery, while border closures and sanctions disrupt supply chains, hindering transportation of humanitarian goods (OCHA, June 2024).

In the Central Sahel, humanitarian workers and infrastructure remain frequent targets. In **Burkina Faso**, where NSAGs control nearly 40 percent of the territory, blockades in 26 cities restricted movement for 800 000 people in 2024, limiting their access to basic services (ACAPS, January 2025). In **Mali**, access is particularly difficult in northern and central areas (OCHA, February 2024; OCHA, January 2025).



The conflict in the Central Sahel began in Mali in 2012 and has since spread widely, with a severe impact on the food security and nutrition status of populations across the region.


The Lake Chad Basin faces similar issues, with NSAGs attacking humanitarian facilities (ACAPS, January 2025).

Climate change is also expected to worsen conditions, with increased floods and droughts making areas unreachable. Counter-terrorism

laws also restrict impartial humanitarian action, limiting access to vulnerable populations (OCHA, June 2024). Urgent efforts are needed to secure humanitarian corridors and improve access for millions in need.

TIMELINE | The evolution of conflicts in the region


LAKE CHAD BASIN (NIGERIA, NIGER, CHAD, CAMEROON) *continued*



2016–2024
Despite military efforts, Boko Haram and ISWAP continue attacks, displacing millions across the region. In 2016–2017 over 50 000 people were in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in northeastern Borno state, Nigeria.

2024
Over 6.5 million IDPs recorded across the Lake Chad Basin, with significant cross-border movements into Chad and Cameroon.

CHAD (REFUGEES AND RETURNEES FROM SUDAN)



2003–2005
The Darfur conflict drives large-scale displacement into eastern Chad, with refugee numbers reaching the hundreds of thousands.

2011–2022
Refugee movements continue as tensions in Darfur and other areas in the Sudan persist.

2023
The conflict in the Sudan from April results in a massive influx of refugees and returnees into eastern Chad. By late 2023, over 720 000 Sudanese refugees and 220 000 Chadian returnees are recorded.


2024
Chad becomes host to over 1.2 million displaced individuals, marking the country's largest-ever refugee crisis.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Persisting conflict, access constraints and high food prices continue to drive the food crisis.

PEAK 2024 (JUNE–AUGUST)

2.7M people or 12% of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 45 provinces during the lean season. Of them, around **0.4M** were in Emergency (CH Phase 4).

Four provinces (Loroum, Soum, Oudalan and Komondjoari) were in CH Phase 4. The situation had improved compared with the 2023 peak, reflecting better food availability linked to favourable cereal and cash crop production. No data were available for the November/December 2024 CH cycle, and thus the evolution of acute food insecurity through 2024 is not fully known.



Source: CH Burkina Faso, March 2024.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2023–2024

Conflict/insecurity Conflict intensified in the second quarter of 2024, reversing a declining trend since 2023 (WFP and FAO, November 2024). In the Sahel, Nord, Centre-Nord and Est regions, food had to be delivered under military escort because of sieges and blockades. Delays in deliveries led to market shortages (FEWS NET, October 2024). Constraints on population movements and humanitarian access were extreme in northern and eastern areas (WFP and FAO, 2024). IDPs have very limited livelihood opportunities.

In some conflict-affected areas, farmers' access to land had improved since 2023, but insecurity still significantly undermined agricultural activities in the Sahel, Est, Nord and Centre-Nord regions, leading to localized production shortfalls (FAO-GIEWS, December 2024).

Economic shocks In August 2024, prices of sorghum and millet were 43 percent and 53 percent higher year-on-year (WFP and FAO, November 2024). High coarse grain


prices are primarily driven by low supply from reduced imports and delayed harvesting in several areas (FAO-GIEWS, December 2024). In conflict-affected areas, prices were even higher due to elevated transport costs and limited supply (FEWS NET, October 2024).

Weather extremes Total cereal production in 2024 was estimated above the previous year's levels and the five-year average (CILSS, November 2024). However, dry spells in the Sud-Ouest region disrupted crop development, resulting in localized lower yields (FEWS NET, October 2024). Heavy rains between July and September triggered flooding in several regions, which caused localized crop losses (FAO-GIEWS, December 2024).

DISPLACEMENT

0.04M refugees and asylum-seekers
2.1M IDPs
Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2024. Source: CONASUR, March 2023.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2024



Source: CH Burkina Faso.

A protracted food crisis A low-income country, Burkina Faso has been in all editions of the GRFC. Acute food insecurity is largely linked to conflict and insecurity in Central Sahel. The number of people in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) peaked in 2022 and slowly reduced in 2023 and 2024. Populations were in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in mid-2020 (11 400), outside the peak in late 2022 (1 800) and in mid-2023 (42 700).


1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine Total population Areas with limited access

NUTRITION CRISIS | The impacts of conflict and insecurity contributed to high levels of acute malnutrition in affected areas.

PEAK (AUGUST 2024–JANUARY 2025)

Of 45 areas analysed, 23 were classified in Serious or worse (IPC AMN Phase 3 or above), with one in Centre-Nord and two in the Sahel regions in Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4). In 2023, no areas were classified in IPC AMN Phase 4. Multiple inaccessible provinces in Centre-Nord, Est, Nord and Sahel were not analysed in 2023–2024.

Outlook 2025 The situation is expected to improve during the February–April low season of acute malnutrition, before worsening in May–July, at similar levels to 2024.



Source: Burkina Faso IPC TWG, February 2025.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION BURDEN (AUGUST 2024–JULY 2025)

0.4M children aged 6–59 months
0.04M pregnant and breastfeeding women
0.3M MAM **0.1M** SAM
Source: Burkina Faso IPC TWG, February 2025.

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS


Fewer than 10 percent of women consumed a sufficiently diverse diet in Sud-Ouest and Plateau Central, and in many areas fewer than 20 percent of children aged 6–23 months had a minimum acceptable diet. Fewer than 30 percent of infants under 6 months were exclusively breastfed in Boucle du Mouhoun, which is considered a Critical level (IPC, February 2025). Levels of diseases – malaria, diarrhoea and acute respiratory infections – were particularly high in Sud-Ouest, Plateau Central, Cascades and Sahel. There was a measles outbreak in Centre Nord (UNICEF, October 2024). Access to improved sanitation was particularly poor in Nord, Plateau Central and Haut Bassins. In areas affected by insecurity and displacement, poor access to basic services and high levels of acute food insecurity increased acute malnutrition risk. Access to healthcare was limited, especially in Sahel and Centre-Nord, where more than half of all health centres closed in 2023 (IPC, February 2025).

1 - Acceptable 2 - Alert 3 - Serious 4 - Critical 5 - Extremely Critical
Not analysed Inadequate evidence

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Cameroon's food crisis in conflict-affected regions was slightly worse than 2023 but not as severe as 2022.**PEAK 2024 (OCTOBER–DECEMBER)**

3.1M people or **11%** of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity. Of them, nearly **0.3M** were in Emergency (CH Phase 4).

This is a slight deterioration since the 2023 peak, mostly related to livelihood disruptions associated with persisting conflicts and floods in the second half of 2024. Out of 58 areas analysed, 13 were in Crisis (CH Phase 3), mostly in northern and western regions.




Source: CH Cameroon, December 2024.

PROJECTION 2025 (JUNE–AUGUST)*

2.6M people or **9%** of the population are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity. Of them, around **0.3M** are projected in CH Phase 4.

Although an improvement, the country still has a concerning food crisis mostly driven by reduced purchasing power associated with livelihood disruptions and high food prices. Out of 58 analysed areas, nine are projected in CH Phase 3, mostly in northern and western regions.



* The projection period differs from the period defined as peak in 2024.
Source: CH Cameroon, April 2025.

DRIVERS OF THE FOOD CRISIS 2024–2025

Conflict/insecurity Persisting conflicts in the Nord-Ouest and Sud-Ouest, and insurgency in the Extrême Nord, caused population displacement and hampered agricultural production and livelihoods. In conflict-affected areas, the reduced harvest led to low household food stocks (RPCA, March 2024; FEWS NET, September 2024).



Economic shocks In conflict-affected areas, average staple food prices remained above the previous year and the five-year average throughout the year, failing to decrease seasonally during the harvest period due to atypically high demand (FEWS NET, September 2024).



Weather extremes In the Extrême Nord, floods from torrential rains between July and

September 2024 led to localized below-average crop yields and livestock losses, reducing food availability (FEWS NET, September 2024). As of November 2024, 0.5 million people were affected, with 155 000 people displaced (OCHA, November 2024). Preliminary forecasts place 2024 cereal production at 5 percent above the recent five-year average (FAO, November 2024).


DISPLACEMENT

0.4M refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2024.

1.0M IDPs

Source: OCHA, December 2024.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2018–2025

Source: CH Cameroon.

A protracted food crisis A lower-middle-income country, Cameroon has been included in all editions of the GRFC. The number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity reached its highest level in 2022. Persisting insecurity and conflict in the Nord-Ouest, Sud-Ouest and Extrême Nord regions, bordering Nigeria and Chad, are the main drivers.

NUTRITION CRISIS | Poor food access, disease outbreaks, and lack of health and nutrition services underpin this nutrition crisis.**PEAK 2024 (JULY–OCTOBER)**

Out of 45 areas analysed, 11 were classified in Serious or worse (IPC AMN Phase 3 or above). Central African Republic refugee sites in Adamaoua and Est regions were worst affected, classified in Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4) for the entire year.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION BURDEN (NOVEMBER 2023–OCTOBER 2024)

0.4M children aged 6–59 months


0.2M MAM

0.15M SAM



12 100 pregnant and breastfeeding women

Source: Cameroon IPC TWG, March 2024.



Source: Cameroon IPC TWG, March 2024.

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Fewer than 20 percent of children aged 6–23 months consumed a minimum acceptable diet in Adamaoua, Extrême Nord, Nord and Sud-Ouest (IPC, March 2024). Women's low dietary diversity was a particular concern in the Extrême Nord region.

Multiple disease outbreaks occurred across the country, including measles and cholera, alongside high levels of acute respiratory infections and diarrhoea. Inadequate access to drinking water and suboptimal hygiene and sanitation practices persisted, especially for refugees in Adamaoua and Est regions and in rural areas, contributing to the spread of diseases. In August, flooding in the Extrême Nord damaged drinking water sources

and latrines, intensifying disease outbreaks (UNICEF, September 2024).

Border area basic social services in Adamaoua and Est regions were overwhelmed due to refugee movements, coinciding with humanitarian assistance funding cuts (IPC, March 2024). By September, the nutrition sector had received only 13 percent of requested funding for 2024 (UN, October 2024). Shortages of ready-to-use therapeutic food and micronutrient powders limited nutrition prevention and treatment service provision, particularly affecting refugees. Measles vaccination coverage remained low partly due to continued vaccine hesitancy since COVID-19 (IPC, March 2024).

1 - Acceptable 2 - Alert 3 - Serious 4 - Critical 5 - Extremely Critical



MUAC



IDPs/other settlements classification




Refugee settlement (area receives significant humanitarian food assistance)

1 - None/Minimal 2 - Stressed 3 - Crisis 4 - Emergency 5 - Catastrophe/Famine Total population

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | A worsening food crisis linked to population displacement, flooding and high food prices.


PEAK 2024 (JUNE–AUGUST)

3.4M people or 20% of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity during the lean season. Of them, about **0.5M** were in Emergency (CH Phase 4). The food security situation deteriorated significantly since the 2023 peak. Out of 69 areas analysed, 41 were in Crisis (CH Phase 3) in the north and east.



PEAK 2024 (OCTOBER–DECEMBER)


0.5M displaced people or 30% of the displaced population face high levels of acute food insecurity. Of them, **0.4M** were refugees.



Source: CH Chad, March and December 2024.


PROJECTION 2025 (JUNE–AUGUST)

3.3M people or 19% of the analysed population are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity. Of them, around **0.3M** are projected in CH Phase 4.



PROJECTION 2025 (JUNE–AUGUST)

0.5M displaced people are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity. Of them, **0.1M** are projected to face CH Phase 4.



Source: CH Chad, April 2025.

DRIVERS OF THE FOOD CRISIS 2024–2025

Conflict/insecurity Refugees and host communities in eastern provinces faced limited food availability and work opportunities due to the large influx of Sudanese refugees and Chadian returnees (FEWS NET, September 2024; WFP and FAO, 2024). In Lac region, the resurgence of civil insecurity is leading to population displacement, livelihood deterioration, and disruption of agriculture and essential services. Insecurity at the Libyan border reduced cross-border trade (FEWS NET, September 2024).

Weather extremes Moisture deficits at the start of the 2024 cropping season led to below-average crop and rangeland production in southern and southeastern provinces (EC-JRC, September 2024). As of October 2024, 432 000 hectares of fields were


destroyed, and 72 000 livestock engulfed, due to the flooding that has affected the country since late July (EU, November 2024), with 1.9 million people affected by November (OCHA, November 2024).

Economic shocks Rising food prices amid reduced local supply limited household food access (CILSS, December 2024). Increased fuel prices, resulting from the removal of government subsidies in the oil sector, led to higher transportation costs and limited food imports (FEWS NET, June 2024).

DISPLACEMENT

1.3M refugees and asylum-seekers
0.2M IDPs
Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2024.
Source: IOM, June 2024.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2025




Source: CH Chad.

A protracted food crisis A low-income country, Chad has been in all editions of the GRFC. Its food crisis has worsened since 2020 due to conflict, insecurity, COVID-19-related economic challenges and weather extremes – notably flooding in 2022 and 2024 – along with internal displacement and refugee influxes.

NUTRITION CRISIS | Food insecurity, insufficient WASH services and flooding left many areas in Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4) conditions.

PEAK 2024 (JUNE–SEPTEMBER)

Out of 43 areas analysed, 26 were classified in Serious or worse (IPC AMN Phase 3 or above). Ten provinces and four departments in the Sahelian belt were in Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4). The nutrition situation showed an overall improvement since 2023.



Source: IPC, January 2024.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION BURDEN (OCTOBER 2023–SEPTEMBER 2024)

1.7M resident children aged 6–59 months
1.3M MAM
0.5M SAM
0.3M pregnant and breastfeeding women

ACUTE MALNUTRITION BURDEN (JANUARY–DECEMBER 2024)

0.06M refugee children aged 6–59 months
0.05M MAM
0.007M SAM

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS


A lack of recent nutrition data led to reliance on data from 2022.

Only 37.4 percent of children aged 6–23 months consumed a minimum acceptable diet (SMART, 2022). The low proportion of mothers practising exclusive breastfeeding (7.4 percent) left many infants vulnerable to disease and malnutrition. High levels of anaemia among children and pregnant women indicated a serious public health problem (WHO, 2019).

Just 22 percent of households have improved latrines nationwide, with nearly 80 percent of the rural population practising open defecation. Only 6 percent of

households used improved basic drinking water sources (IPC, January 2024; SMART, 2022). A measles outbreak has continued since 2023 (IPC, January 2024). Mid-year flooding heightened the cholera risk and restricted access to communities in eastern and southern Chad (UNICEF, September and October 2024).

The large refugee influx placed additional pressure on existing basic services (IPC, January 2024). Humanitarian funding shortages led to a lack of ready-to-use therapeutic food to treat acute malnutrition (UNICEF, October 2024).



ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | The severity of acute food insecurity eased in 2024.

PEAK 2024 (JUNE–AUGUST)

1M people or 7% of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity during the lean season. No populations were in Emergency (CH Phase 4), down from 0.01M in 2023.

The increase since 2023 is partly due to expanded analysis coverage. Out of 34 areas analysed, none were in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above).



Source: CH Guinea, March 2024.

PROJECTION 2025 (MARCH–MAY)*

1.8M people or 13% of the total population are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity. Of them, **0.09M** are projected in CH Phase 4.

This deterioration since 2024 is due to flood impacts. No areas are projected to be in CH Phase 3 or above.

* The projection period differs from the period defined as peak in 2024.
Source: CH Guinea, April 2025.



DRIVERS OF THE FOOD CRISIS 2024–2025

Economic shocks In March 2024, cereal prices were 23 percent above the five-year average and 8 percent higher year-on-year due to rising transportation costs following a fire at the main fuel depot in Conakry that triggered a fuel crisis. However, a significant increase in the prices of cash crops (peanuts and palm oil) and cattle contributed to balancing the purchasing power of producers (CH, March 2024).


Weather extremes During summer 2024, torrential rains caused flooding in several localities, submerging over 18 000 hectares of farmland (GCI, October 2024). However, aggregate cereal production for the 2023/24 and 2024/25 seasons was estimated at average to above-average levels, reflecting conducive weather conditions overall (ASAP, October 2023; FAO-GIEWS, May 2024; ASAP, October 2024; CILSS, December 2024).

DISPLACEMENT

2 500 refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2024.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2025



Source: CH Guinea.

A protracted food crisis A low-income country, Guinea has been included in all editions of the GRFC. Between 2019 and 2022, the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity more than quadrupled, from 0.3 million to 1.2 million. The situation gradually improved between 2022 and 2024, with no populations in CH Phase 4.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | High food prices diminished household purchasing power.

PEAK 2024 (JUNE–AUGUST)

0.1M people or 7% of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity during the lean season. None were in Emergency (CH Phase 4).

Although not selected last year, previous CH analyses showed that the situation has deteriorated since the 2023 lean season due to diminished household purchasing power. Out of the nine regions analysed, none faced Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above).



Source: CH Guinea-Bissau, March 2024.

PROJECTION 2025 (JUNE–AUGUST)

0.1M people or 8% of the total population are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity during the lean season. None are in CH Phase 4.

The situation is expected to slightly deteriorate compared with 2024. Out of nine areas analysed, none are projected to face CH Phase 3 or above.

Source: CH Guinea-Bissau, April 2025.




DRIVERS OF THE FOOD CRISIS 2024–2025

Economic shocks The prices of major staple commodities were above their 2023 and five-year average levels, limiting households' purchasing power and food access. The retail price of cashews, a key cash crop, was 24 percent below the five-year average, lowering incomes and food access for cashew producers (RPCA, March 2024).

Weather extremes During 2024, cumulative rainfall amounts were generally adequate to satisfy cereal crop water requirements. However, localized production shortfalls were observed in some parts of the region of Gabú, where recurrent dry spells between June and August affected crop establishment and development. In rice-producing areas, rainfall deficits in August affected the establishment and development of early planted rice crops, in particular in northern parts of the region of Oio. The 2024 aggregate cereal production is estimated to be about 13 percent above the recent five-year average (FAO-GIEWS, October 2024).

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2021, 2024–2025




Source: CH Guinea-Bissau.

History of the food crisis A low-income country, Guinea-Bissau was included in the GRFC from 2016 to 2021 and in 2024. In 2022 and 2023, it did not qualify for inclusion. Over the past five years, the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity has remained relatively stable, ranging between 95 000 and 150 000 or 7–12 percent of the population.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Elevated food prices constrained household food access.


PEAK 2023 (JUNE–AUGUST) (NO 2024 DATA AVAILABLE)

0.5M people or **11%** of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity during the lean season 2023. Of them, around **21 400** were in Emergency (CH Phase 4).



Source: CH Liberia, November 2022.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2023



Source: CH Liberia.

A protracted food crisis A low-income country, Liberia has been included in all editions of the GRFC. The acute food insecurity situation worsened significantly from 2020, when the country suffered from the economic repercussions of the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2021, the proportion of the population facing high levels of acute food insecurity peaked at 20 percent and 0.2 million people faced CH Phase 4. The high import dependency of the country makes it vulnerable to food supply and price shocks.

DRIVERS OF THE FOOD CRISIS 2024–2025

Economic shocks The collapse of domestic supply chains and increasing reliance on imports makes food availability and access vulnerable to global market volatility. Local currency depreciated marginally (by 1 percent) in 2024, with high transport costs and supply chain hiccups making food more expensive, which further constrained household purchasing power (CILSS, December 2024).

Weather extremes Torrential rains in June displaced 8 000 people, and severely damaged homes, schools and hospitals in Montserrado, Margibi and Grand Bassa counties (OCHA, July 2024).

The 2023/2024 rice and cassava production was at five-year average levels (CILSS, March 2024). Cereal production for 2024/2025 is anticipated to increase by 11 percent compared with the recent five-year average (CILSS, December 2024).

Food inflation was particularly high in the first half of 2024. It ranged from 25 to 28 percent year-on-year between January and April 2024, but decreased to around 12 percent in April and May (Central Bank of Liberia, December 2024).

The annual mean inflation rate reduced to 7.7 percent following proactive monetary measures and a stable microeconomic environment (CILSS, December 2024).

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | The food security situation deteriorated in conflict and insecurity-affected areas.**PEAK 2024 (JUNE–AUGUST)**

1.4M people or 6% of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity during the lean season. Of them, around **0.1M** were in Emergency (CH Phase 4).

This is an increase of 0.1 million people since the 2023 lean season, mostly linked to persisting insecurity. Out of 56 areas analysed, one (Ménaka) was classified in CH Phase 4 and 11 in Crisis (CH Phase 3).

In conflict-affected Ménaka (Gao), **2 600** people still faced **Catastrophe** (CH Phase 5) due to conflict and humanitarian access constraints.

Source: CH Mali, March 2024.

PROJECTION 2025 (JUNE–AUGUST)

1.5M people or 6% of the total population are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity during the lean season. Of them, around **0.06M** are in CH Phase 4.

The situation is expected to worsen, driven by intensifying conflict, displacement and flood impacts. Out of 56 areas analysed, two are projected to be in CH Phase 4 (Ménaka and Kidal) and ten in CH Phase 3.

In conflict-affected Ménaka (Gao), **2 600** people are projected to face **Catastrophe** (CH Phase 5).

Source: CH Mali, December 2024.

DRIVERS OF THE FOOD CRISIS 2024–2025

Conflict/insecurity In central and northern regions, armed attacks, cattle theft and looting reduced cultivated areas and led to population displacement. In Ménaka, insecurity disrupted trade, leading to shortages of essential goods. Blockades by NSAGs limited humanitarian interventions in certain areas (CH, March 2024) and are likely to continue in 2025 (FAO & WFP, November 2024; CILSS, April 2025). The re-emergence of an insurgency in Kidal is likely to drive displacement (ICG, July 2024).

Economic shocks Cereal prices were above their five-year average throughout 2024. In August, prices of key staples sorghum and millet were 50–58 percent higher on a year-on-year basis (CH, March 2024; FEWS NET, September 2024).

Weather extremes While 2023/2024 national cereal production was near average, in central and northern areas erratic rainfall reduced yields (FAO-GIEWS, November 2024). The government declared a national state of disaster following flooding that inundated about 1 million hectares of low-lying cropland from August to September (FEWS NET, September 2024), presaging reduced cereal production for 2024/2025 (FAO, October 2024; EC-JRC, September 2024).


DISPLACEMENT

0.1M refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2024.

0.4M IDPs

Source: IOM, September 2024.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2025


Source: CH Mali.

A protracted food crisis A low-income country, Mali has been included in all editions of the GRFC. It was part of the Central Sahel regional crisis in 2019. From 2020, security conditions deteriorated across northern and central areas. The population facing CH Phase 3 reached 1.8 million people in mid-2022 before moderately improving in 2023, but acute food insecurity levels increased in 2024 mostly because of insecurity.

NUTRITION CRISIS | Inadequate diets, high levels of disease and reduced food assistance contributed to acute malnutrition.**PEAK 2024 (JUNE–OCTOBER)**

Out of 54 areas analysed, over half were in Serious or worse (IPC AMN Phase 3 or above), with 11 in Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4) and an IDP site in Gao in Extremely Critical (IPC AMN Phase 5). This is an improvement since 2023 but with localized deteriorations.

Outlook 2025 By May 2025, IDPs in Gao should transition from IPC AMN Phase 5 to IPC AMN Phase 4, while the outlook for elsewhere is mixed.



Source: Mali IPC TWG, November 2024.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION BURDEN (JUNE 2024–MAY 2025)

1.6M children aged 6–59 months

1.2M MAM 0.4M SAM

Source: Mali IPC TWG, November 2024.

0.9M pregnant and breastfeeding women

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS


No more than 21 percent of children aged 6–23 months consumed a minimum acceptable diet in any area, falling to 1 percent in the Gao region. Acute food insecurity worsened acute malnutrition, particularly in Ménaka region and IDP sites. Exclusive breastfeeding rates were as low as 18 percent, with the notable exception of Segou and Ménaka, where rates exceeded 80 percent (IPC, November 2024).

A lack of improved sources of drinking water (especially for IDPs) and poor sanitation and hygiene heightened disease risks, with high levels of malaria, diarrhoea and/or acute respiratory infections in children, especially in Bamako, Gao, Koulikoro, Tombouctou and Ménaka.

There was a measles outbreak in IDP camps in Gao and Kidal regions (IPC, November 2024).


Insecurity restricted health and nutrition service coverage, with significant variations in nutrition coverage across conflict-affected regions (ranging from 0.4 percent in Kidal to 100 percent in Gao). Floods and insecurity limited humanitarian access and nutrition supplies (IPC, November 2024).

Population displacement and reduced humanitarian funding in 2023–2024 led to precarious living conditions for IDPs and overburdened host populations, particularly in Gao (IPC, November 2024).




ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Economic challenges, dry spells and floods worsened acute food insecurity.

PEAK 2024 (JUNE–AUGUST)

 **0.7M** people or **14%** of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity during the lean season. Of them, around **0.03M** were in Emergency (CH Phase 4).

The situation has worsened since the 2023 peak, driven by high staple food prices and reduced production of coarse grains and livestock in the 2023/2024 season. Out of 61 areas analysed, 32 areas were in Crisis (CH Phase 3).

Source: CH Mauritania, March 2024.




PROJECTION 2025 (JUNE–AUGUST)

 **0.6M** people or **12%** of the total population are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity during the lean season. Of them, around **0.01M** are projected to face CH Phase 4.


This marks a slight improvement, reflecting near average cereal crop production, despite a light year-on-year decline. Out of 55 areas analysed, 17 are projected in CH Phase 3.

Source: CH Mauritania, April 2025.



DRIVERS OF THE FOOD CRISIS 2024–2025

 **Economic shocks** In 2024, high staple food prices limited food access, especially for urban poor, mining-dependent households, and displaced populations, who face limited employment. Poor households reliant on livestock, domestic work or handicrafts are heavily dependent on humanitarian food aid (FEWS NET, June and October 2024).

 **Weather extremes** Low yields of rained crops, including staples millet, sorghum and maize, in the 2023/24 agricultural season, along with poor pasture in northern and eastern regions due to rainfall deficits, worsened food insecurity in early 2024. In contrast, the 2024/25 agricultural season saw a significant improvement and was above the average, reflecting

abundant rainfall that supported crops and pasture generation, which largely surpassed localized crop losses caused by floods (CILSS, December 2024).


 **Conflict/insecurity** Persistent conflict in Mali is driving a growing refugee influx, straining resources and markets. With Mbera camp in the Hodh El Chargui region overcrowded, new arrivals settle in nearby poverty-stricken areas, heightening demand for scarce food and resources (UNHCR, September 2024).

DISPLACEMENT

 **0.2M** refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2024.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2025



Source: CH Mauritania.


A protracted food crisis A lower-middle-income country, Mauritania has been included in all GRFC editions largely due to weather extremes impacting food production and affecting poor urban populations, traditional farmers and pastoralists. Since 2018, the prevalence of acute food insecurity has remained above 10 percent. It peaked in 2022 with 20 percent facing high levels of acute food insecurity, driven by a severe drought, high food inflation and limited trade.

NUTRITION CRISIS | Acute malnutrition was particularly concerning in Mbera refugee camp and makeshift camps in Hodh El Chargui.

PEAK 2022 (JANUARY–DECEMBER)*

The most recent data from 2022 found 12 out of 15 regions had acute malnutrition prevalence equal to or greater than 10 percent, equivalent to Serious or worse (IPC AMN Phase 3 or above). Of these, five regions had prevalences equal to or greater than 15 percent. This was a deterioration from 2021 (SMART 2021, 2022).

ACUTE MALNUTRITION BURDEN 2024



Source: UNICEF-WFP food security and nutrition hotspot analysis, February 2024.

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Limited recent data constrains up-to-date insights into the country's nutritional situation.

Nationwide, infant and young child feeding practices were suboptimal, with one in two households unable to afford the lowest-cost nutritious diet. The situation was worst in pastoral zones (WFP, October 2024). In 2019–2021, only 9 percent of 6–23-month-olds received a minimum acceptable diet and exclusive breastfeeding rates were suboptimal at 41 percent (DHS, 2022).

High anaemia levels among women of childbearing age (56 percent) and children under 5 years (77 percent) were a severe public health problem (WFP, October 2024). Over 15 percent of children under 5 years had a fever

in the two weeks before the survey, with advice or treatment only sought for a third of cases (DHS, 2022).

In Hodh El Chargui region, the large Malian refugee influx led to overcrowding at Mbera camp and in nearby makeshift camps. Pre-influx, host communities' basic services were already limited, and quickly became overwhelmed (EC, August 2024). High levels of food insecurity, severe water shortages, a measles outbreak and only 3 percent of households having access to latrines, resulting in open defecation, contributed to acute malnutrition. Access to healthcare was poor (UNHCR, October 2024; IFRC, November 2024; UNICEF, August 2024).


*No recent acute malnutrition prevalence data available for 2023 and 2024.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Conflict-related displacement and trade disruptions maintained high levels of acute food insecurity.

PEAK 2024 (JUNE–AUGUST)

3.4M people or 13% of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity during the lean season. Of them, around **0.1M** faced Emergency (CH Phase 4) in Diffa, Maradi and Tahoua.

Overall, this is 0.1 million more people facing high levels of acute food insecurity than during the 2023 peak. Out of 78 areas analysed, 21 were classified in Crisis (CH Phase 3) in conflict-affected Diffa, Tillabéri, Tahoua and Maradi.




Source: CH Niger, March 2024.

PROJECTION 2025 (JUNE–AUGUST)

2.2M people or 8% of the total population are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity during the lean season. Of them, around **0.1M** are projected to face CH Phase 4.

This marks a significant improvement since 2024 due to a better 2024/2025 than 2023/2024 harvest (FAO, November 2024). Out of 78 areas analysed, 12 are projected to be in CH Phase 3 and none in CH Phase 4.



Source: CH Niger, December 2024.

DRIVERS OF THE CRISIS 2024–2025

Conflict/insecurity Conflict in Tillabéri, north and east Tahoua, and south Diffa and Maradi displaced populations, led to the abandonment of arable land, and disrupted the supply and functioning of markets. The number of IDPs increased by 51 percent in the year to June 2024 (UNHCR, July 2024).

Weather extremes An earlier-than-usual start to the lean season because of significant cereal and fodder deficits left 40 percent of households without food stocks by February 2024 (CH, March 2024). Flooding between May and August damaged 24 000 hectares of crops and caused the loss of 25 000 heads of livestock, with 1.5 million people affected (EU-JRC, November 2024).

Economic shocks Border closures and conflict-related trade disruptions led to soaring prices of local and imported products in 2024 (FEWS NET, September 2024; DIEM, October 2024). ECOWAS economic sanctions were lifted in February 2024 but market supply remained low (FEWS NET, March 2024). Cross-border trade with Nigeria resumed but was below pre-July 2023 levels due to low food availability and currency depreciation (FEWS NET, June 2024). In addition, the Benin–Niger border closure reduced cereal imports and decreased export revenues (WFP and FAO, November 2024).

DISPLACEMENT


0.4M refugees and asylum-seekers

0.5M IDPs

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2024.

Source: UNHCR, October 2024.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2025




Source: CH Niger.

A protracted food crisis A low-income country, the Niger has been in all editions of the GRFC. Persistent insecurity, internal displacement, high food prices, floods, droughts and the impacts of COVID-19 resulted in sustained increases in the number of people facing acute food insecurity since 2018. The numbers peaked at 4.4 million people in 2022 due to poor harvests. After a slight decrease in 2023, they increased again in 2024.

NUTRITION CRISIS | A critical nutrition situation persisted, worse in areas affected by flooding and insecurity.

PEAK 2024 (AUGUST–NOVEMBER)

Outlook 2025 During May–July, the situation is projected to deteriorate, with 51 areas in IPC AMN Phase 3 or above and nine in Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4).



Source: Niger IPC TWG, January 2025.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION BURDEN (AUGUST 2024–JULY 2025)

1.7M children aged 6–59 months

0.1M pregnant and breastfeeding women

1.3M MAM

0.4M SAM

Source: Niger IPC TWG, January 2025.

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

The worst flooding since 2020 and growing insecurity were the primary shocks contributing to acute malnutrition in 2024, impacting Diffa, Tillabéri, Maradi and Tahoua regions. Diarrhoea, malaria and acute respiratory infections were higher than the previous five years in many areas. Flooding worsened access to safe drinking water and sanitation, with access to improved sanitation as low as 6 percent in Tchintabaraden department in Tahoua region (IPC, January 2025). Cholera and measles outbreaks occurred in multiple regions (UNICEF, December 2024).

Tahoua region. Anaemia levels were high among women of reproductive age and children under 5 years, reaching over 40 percent in multiple areas. Recent data on the quantity or quality of children's and women's diets were unavailable, yet historical data indicated this as a major contributing factor (IPC, January 2025).

Poor access to healthcare was a particular challenge in Agadez, Tillabéri and Tahoua regions, with suboptimal measles vaccination coverage. Flooding and insufficient nutrition supplies further limited access (UN, August 2024). Insecurity-related displacement left many in Diffa, Maradi, Tahoua and Tillabéri regions with suboptimal access to basic services (IPC, January 2025).


In multiple areas fewer than 30 percent of infants aged 0–6 months were exclusively breastfed, reaching as low as 3.4 percent in Abalak department in

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Insecurity, inflation and flooding continued to worsen the food crisis.**PEAK 2024 (JUNE–AUGUST)**

31.8M people or 16% of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity during the lean season. Of them, around 1.0M were in Emergency (CH Phase 4).

This includes **0.08M** IDPs in Zamfara and Sokoto. Of them, more than **0.02M** were in CH Phase 4.

The situation has worsened since 2023 due to high inflation and increasing conflict and displacement in the northeast. Out of the 552 areas analysed, 186 were in Crisis (CH Phase 3) and three in Emergency (CH Phase 4), all in Borno state.




Source: CH Nigeria, March 2024.

PROJECTION 2025 (JUNE–AUGUST)

30.6M people or 15% of the analysed population are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity during the lean season. Of them, around 1.2M are projected in CH Phase 4.

This includes **0.1M** IDPs in Borno, Sokoto and Zamfara.

Despite a slight decrease in the number of people in CH Phase 3 or above, driven by stable crop production and declining inflation, the situation remains concerning. Increased numbers of people in CH Phase 4 are projected in some areas. Out of 548 areas analysed, 162 are projected in CH Phase 3.



Source: CH Nigeria, April 2025.

DRIVERS OF THE FOOD CRISIS 2024–2025

Conflict/insecurity In the northeast, northwest and north-central zones, there has been a marked increase in violent events since 2023 (ACLED, December 2024). Insecurity continued to displace people, disrupt market access and restrict access to agricultural lands, significantly impacting livelihoods (FAO-GIEWS, August 2024).

Weather extremes Localized dry spells in June–July and flooding in August–September led to a below-average 2024 cereal harvest (FAO-GIEWS, November 2024). The flooding affected 1.2 million people in 31 states, damaged 700 000 hectares of cropland and caused severe infrastructure damage (OCHA, October 2024). In Yobe, flooding led to the collapse of three bridges, disrupting the movement of goods to

local markets. In Borno, the collapse of the Alau dam in September 2024 destroyed croplands (FEWS NET, October 2024).

Economic shocks Food inflation averaged 39 percent month-to-month from June to August 2024 (IMF, 2024). High prices were driven by local currency depreciation affecting import prices, high fuel prices increasing transportation costs and reduced availability from the below-average harvest (FEWS NET, October 2024).


DISPLACEMENT

0.1M refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2024.

3.4M IDPs

Source: IOM, September 2024.


Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2025

Source: CH Nigeria.

A protracted food crisis A lower-middle-income country, Nigeria has been included in all editions of the GRFC, with high severity of acute food insecurity recorded in the conflict-affected northeastern states. Populations were recorded in Catastrophe (CH Phase 5) in 2016 and 2017. The CH coverage has expanded since 2020, from around 50 percent of the population to 89 percent in late 2024, while the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity has increased each year since 2019.

NUTRITION CRISIS | A worsening crisis due to acute food insecurity, poor healthcare and disease outbreaks, underpinned by conflict.**PEAK 2024 (MAY–SEPTEMBER)**

Out of 133 areas analysed in the northeast and northwest, 84 were in Serious or worse (IPC AMN Phase 3 or above), with 34 in Critical (IPC AMN Phase 4). This is a significant deterioration since 2023. **Outlook 2025** The situation is expected to worsen in the northeast through April, with six more areas in IPC AMN Phase 4, and improve in the northwest, with nine fewer areas in IPC AMN Phase 4.



Source: Nigeria IPC TWG, November 2024.

ACUTE MALNUTRITION BURDEN 2024 (MAY 2024–APRIL 2025)

5.4M children aged 6–59 months

3.7M MAM

Source: Nigeria IPC TWG, November 2024.

0.8M pregnant and breastfeeding women

1.8M SAM


CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Only 7–27 percent of children aged 6–23 months in the northeast and 0.5–34 percent in the northwest received the minimum acceptable diet. Acute food insecurity and suboptimal breastfeeding practices were risk factors for acute malnutrition, further challenged in the northwest by delayed breastfeeding initiation and introduction of solid foods. Both areas had high levels of maternal acute malnutrition (IPC, November 2024).

Limited access to improved sanitation facilities contributed to disease outbreaks in both areas, particularly among displaced populations often living in

overcrowded conditions (IPC, November 2024). Malaria and diarrhoea were prevalent. A cholera outbreak occurred in the northeast, exacerbated by flooding and inadequate water and sanitation infrastructure (UN, October 2024).


Access to healthcare was inadequate. In the northeast, widespread displacement, infrastructure destruction and the closure of many social services, due to flooding and insecurity, increased the risk of acute malnutrition. In the northwest, flooding and insecurity contributed to suboptimal health-seeking behaviours (IPC, November 2024).



ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Acute food insecurity declined between 2023 and 2024 but is projected to worsen significantly in 2025.**PEAK 2024 (OCTOBER–DECEMBER)**

0.9M people or **5%** of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity in 46 areas. Of them, around **0.06M** were in Emergency (CH Phase 4).

This peak occurred after the typical lean season of June–August, reflecting the negative impacts of floods in northern and eastern areas. Out of 46 areas analysed, six were classified in CH Phase 3.




Source: CH Senegal, December 2024.

PROJECTION 2025 (JUNE–AUGUST)*

1.3M people or **7%** of the total population are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity. Of them, around **0.09M** are projected in CH Phase 4.

This represents a deterioration since 2024 and the highest number of people recorded in CH history for the country. It reflects a significant reduction of crop production in 2024/25. Out of 46 areas analysed, nine are projected to be in CH Phase 3 and none in CH Phase 4.



The projection period differs from the period defined as peak in 2024.

Source: CH Senegal, April 2025.

DRIVERS OF THE FOOD CRISIS 2024–2025

Economic shocks Food prices remained above their five-year average levels (FEWS NET, October 2024). National average retail prices for rice, Senegal's most consumed cereal, increased, with local and imported rice exceeding their five-year averages by 28 percent and 25 percent, respectively. While millet and maize prices stabilized near their five-year averages, sorghum prices increased, rising 6 percent above their 2023 levels and 21 percent above the five-year average as of October 2024 (CILSS, December 2024).

Weather extremes Weather extremes were significant in the second half of 2024, including an early start to the rainy season followed by a prolonged dry spell between August and September (FAO, December 2024).


Exceptional flooding along the Senegal and Gambia rivers caused extensive damage, with 24 percent of crop losses reported in Matam. These climatic events resulted in a 48 percent year-on-year drop in cereal production, 41 percent below the recent five-year average, along with reduced legume, tuber and cash crop outputs (CILSS, December 2024).

Livelihoods deteriorated, particularly in northern regions. Forage availability was mixed, but milk production increased slightly.

DISPLACEMENT

13 100 refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2024.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2025

Source: CH Senegal.

A protracted food crisis A low-income country, Senegal has been identified as a food crisis in all editions of the GRFC as it required external assistance to respond to economic shocks and weather extremes. In 2023, the number of people in Crisis or worse (CH Phase 3 or above) surpassed 1 million for the first time in CH history. In 2025, acute food insecurity is projected to be even higher due to severe floods and significant drops in crop production.

NUTRITION CRISIS | Inadequate diets, poor WASH and health facilities, and flooding contributed to pockets of acute malnutrition.**PEAK 2023 (JANUARY–DECEMBER)***

In 2023, six out of 14 regions had acute malnutrition prevalence estimates greater than 10 percent. The prevalence was very high in Diourbel (17.1 percent), Tambacounda (17.8 percent) and Matam (22.2 percent). The situation deteriorated since the previous survey in 2019, when no regions had a prevalence greater than 15 percent, and only two above 10 percent (DHS, 2023; DHS, 2019).

ACUTE MALNUTRITION BURDEN 2024

0.4M children aged 6–59 months
0.3M MAM 0.08M SAM

Source: UNICEF-WFP hotspot analysis, 2024.

CONTRIBUTING FACTORS

Nationally, only 6.9 percent of children aged 6–23 months consumed a minimum acceptable diet. Between 43–69 percent of women consumed a minimally diverse diet in the six regions, with acute malnutrition prevalence equal to or greater than 10 percent. Exclusive breastfeeding rates were suboptimal (26–52 percent), with the lowest rates observed in Tambacounda region (DHS, 2023). Micronutrient deficiencies were also a major public health problem countrywide, with over two-thirds of children aged 6–59 months suffering from anaemia (DHS, 2017).

Water and sanitation infrastructure and access to clean drinking water remained a challenge, primarily for pastoral populations (DHS, 2023). Malaria was endemic, with floods on the Senegal and Gambia rivers contaminating water sources and further increasing malaria and diarrhoeal disease prevalence in the north and east, including in Matam region (UNICEF, November 2024). A weak health system led to suboptimal measles vaccination coverage (41–78 percent) and vitamin A supplementation coverage (7–20 percent) (DHS, 2023). Flooding further restricted healthcare access with health facilities closed and roads blocked (UNICEF, November 2024).

*No recent acute malnutrition prevalence data available for 2024.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Persistent high inflation continued to drive acute food insecurity.

PEAK 2024 (JUNE–AUGUST)

1.6M people or 20% of the total population faced high levels of acute food insecurity during the lean season. Of them, **0.03M** were in Emergency (CH Phase 4).

The situation was worse than the 2023 lean season, driven by high inflation and declining food access. Seven out of 16 areas analysed were classified in Crisis (CH Phase 3).

Source: CH Sierra Leone, March 2024.


PROJECTION 2025 (JUNE–AUGUST)

1.2M people or 14% of the total population are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity during the lean season. Of them, **0.1M** are in CH Phase 4.

An above-average cereal production forecast drove an estimated improvement. Five out of 16 areas analysed are projected in CH Phase 3.

Source: CH Sierra Leone, April 2025.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2016–2025



Source: CH Sierra Leone.

DRIVERS OF THE FOOD CRISIS 2024–2025

Economic shocks Despite inflation decreasing since November 2023, food inflation still stood at 23 percent in August 2024 (IMF, 2024). Coupled with high poverty rates and elevated fuel prices, this constrained household food access (IMF, October 2024).

The abolition of the rice subsidy, combined with high transit costs, drove up imported and local rice prices, which, in turn, raised demand for – and the price of – cassava (WFP, June 2024).

Weather extremes Delayed and erratically distributed May–October rains reduced yields in some areas. Heavy rainfall from August to November led to widespread flooding, resulting in economic losses for farming communities and localized crop losses (IRFC, October 2024; FAO-GIEWS, December 2024). Still aggregate 2024 cereal production is forecast at 14 percent above the five-year average (FAO-GIEWS, December 2024).

A protracted food crisis A low-income country, Sierra Leone has been in all editions of the GRFC. The number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity has slightly reduced since the 2021 peak of 1.8 million. In 2024, the number of people facing high levels of acute food insecurity remains above 1 million people, reflecting persistent inflationary pressures and high food prices.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | The situation worsened in the north due to spillover of instability in the Sahel.

PEAK 2024 (OCTOBER–DECEMBER)

0.6M people or 10% of the analysed population faced high levels of acute food insecurity outside the lean season. No populations were in Emergency (CH Phase 4). The increase since the 2023 peak is associated with the spillover of the Central Sahel crisis and reduced food access. Out of the 37 analysed areas, two were in Crisis (CH Phase 3) in northern areas.

Source: CH Togo, December 2024.

PROJECTION 2025 (JUNE–AUGUST)*

0.6M people or 10% of the analysed population are projected to face high levels of acute food insecurity during the lean season. No population is projected in CH Phase 4. This is slightly worse than in 2024, due to projected low cereal production and increasing insecurity in northern regions. Five areas are projected in CH Phase 3.

* The projection period differs from the period defined as peak in 2024.

Source: CH Togo, December 2024.

DRIVERS OF THE FOOD CRISIS 2024–2025

Conflict/insecurity The spillover of the Sahel crisis into northern Togo worsened security, particularly in the Savanes region. The refugee influx strained local resources and destabilized livelihoods (FEWS NET, July 2024).

Economic shocks Cereal prices remained near year-earlier levels but above the five-year average.

Weather extremes Dry spells from July to August impacted crops in parts of Centrale, Kara and Savanes regions, causing a 4 percent year-on-year decline in cereal production. Despite this, national production remained above the five-year average (CILSS, December 2024).

DISPLACEMENT


55 000 refugees and asylum-seekers

Source: UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2024.

9 700 IDPs

Source: UNHCR, October 2024.

Peak numbers of people (in millions) by phase of acute food insecurity, 2020, 2022–2025



Source: CH, Togo.

History of the food crisis A low-income country, Togo has been included in four editions of the GRFC. Economic shocks have been the primary driver of acute food insecurity, which peaked in 2022 at 0.6 million people, or 9 percent of the analysed population, amid record-high food prices.

ACUTE FOOD INSECURITY | Refugees in the northern countries of the Gulf of Guinea: Benin, Côte d'Ivoire and Togo.

The humanitarian and security crises in the Central Sahel began to rapidly spread into the northern regions of coastal countries along the Gulf of Guinea in 2022, including Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana (where refugees were not selected as facing food crises in the GRFC 2025 due to low numbers receiving external assistance) and Togo.

The conflict in Burkina Faso drove displacement into these regions, with an estimated 87 000 asylum-seekers across the four countries at the start of 2024, increasing to almost 116 000 asylum-seekers and 74 000 refugees by December 2024 (UNHCR, December 2024). The majority were from Burkina Faso, most of whom were women and children.

Most have settled in Côte d'Ivoire, Togo, Benin and Ghana (UNHCR, December 2024). Insecurity has also led to almost 19 000 IDPs across Benin and Togo (UNHCR, October 2024). See figure 3.12 below.

Prior to the influx, the northern regions of these countries already faced development challenges and acute food insecurity, with many of the hosting regions classified in Stressed (CH Phase 2) and, in the case of Togo, Crisis (CH Phase 3) (CILSS and FSIN, 2024).


The four countries responded with asylum and integration of these populations into national systems, but the additional demand on essential public services and infrastructure led governments to request support from the international community to help meet the needs of refugees, IDPs and host communities.

The conflict and insecurity have affected pastoral flows, which are a major economic activity for the region, and already under pressure due to climate change and increasing demographic pressure. Border closures and insecurity affected where livestock concentrated, the migration paths they followed and thus the market and social dynamics along them (IOM, December 2024; CILSS and FSIN, 2024).

FIG 3.12 Displacement in the northern areas of the coastal countries of the Gulf of Guinea

Countries	Total number of forcibly displaced people	Number of refugees and asylum-seekers	Number of IDPs
Benin	48 000	36 000	13 000
Côte d'Ivoire	74 000	74 000	-
Togo	65 000	55 000	9 700

Sources: Refugees and asylum-seekers – UNHCR Nowcasted estimate, December 2024; IDPs – UNHCR, October 2024.



Selected for inclusion in the GRFC 2025 but lack data meeting GRFC technical requirements.
Indicates refugee population (colour coded in the same way as countries).

Benin (refugees)

The departments of Atacora and Alibori in northern Benin, which host the majority of refugees, are some of the least developed in the country.

Vaccination rates for children were lower than the 12.8 percent national average, at 9.5 percent and 6.3 percent respectively, and the incidence of diarrhoeal diseases was higher than average. Severe acute malnutrition levels were above Emergency (CH Phase 4) thresholds in Alibori and Atacora, at 2.5 percent and 2.1 percent respectively (UNHCR/WFP/IOM/UNICEF, March 2024), and malaria prevalence was high (MSF, December 2024). The two areas also hosted IDPs, putting additional strain on services.

While the 2024 aggregate cereal production in Benin was forecast at about 22 percent above the five-year average, refugee-hosting departments faced localized production shortfalls due to insecurity disrupting agricultural activities (FAO, October 2024).

Border closures with the Niger and restrictions on pastoralism limited the movement of goods including humanitarian assistance, although in July routes for humanitarian assistance were opened through Nigeria to bypass the blockade (GRANIT, September 2024).

Côte d'Ivoire (refugees)

The majority of refugees in the northern areas of the Gulf of Guinea coastal countries are hosted in Côte d'Ivoire, with almost 70 500 arrivals since 2021, and a steadily increasing trend of arrivals observed through 2024 (UNHCR, December 2024).

Almost half of them were in the department of Tehini in Bounkani, as well as in Tchologo (ICRC, November 2024). The majority came from Burkina Faso, 72 percent of them were women and children and most (77 percent) settled with host communities in rural areas (UNHCR, December 2024). No IDPs were reported in the country.

These northern regions had already

been less developed before the influx of refugees, and local livelihoods, food stocks and services have experienced increased pressure. At least 1 100 children were treated for acute malnutrition in the two regions (FAO, December 2024; UNICEF, October 2024).

Pastoralism was particularly affected in the region, with many Burkinabé pastoralists settling in Bounkani for longer than usual, or even not migrating at all. This has led to increased incidents between farmers and pastoralists involving damaged crops and livestock theft (IOM, December 2024).

Togo (refugees)

In August, the government extended the state of emergency in the Savanes region due to insecurity that has led to the internal displacement of over 4 000 households (GRANIT, November 2024).

The country is hosting 55 000 refugees (UNHCR, December 2024). While data are available for the resident population in Togo, there was no specific assessment on the acute food insecurity situation of refugees.

The Savanes region already faced high poverty, a lack of availability of basic social services and poor food security (UNHCR, WFP, IOM, UNICEF, 2024). Insecurity resulted in below-average sowings in the area, as it limited farmers' access to land (FAO, October 2024). The food security of all population groups deteriorated through the lean season, and prices of food were higher than the five-year average throughout the country, limiting access to food for market-dependent households (FEWS NET, July 2024).